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DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF STATES IN
STATU NASCENDI:
THE CASE OF PALESTINE
Sanford R. Silverberg*
When I ask the Palestinians if they'll stamp my passport,
they say "Burhureyya" ("with independence.") Palestine is
still not a state.'
I. INTRODUCTION
It was a concluding observation, made with some degree of pre-
science, that "we can only wait and observe the way the international po-
litical system, but more particularly the West, adapt to a rearrangement of
national dominance with the U.N. and a shift in the emphasis of support-
ing norms and values."2 The argument, as previously outlined, is now
extended here to wit: The character of the contemporary international
political system has lent itself to the expansion of recognized acceptable
subjects of international law to what is, for lack of an accepted term, a
latent and tentative territorial unit, an "entity." Because the state, as the
traditional political actor at the international system level, is now com-
plemented by other styles of authoritative organizations that conduct af-
fairs that at least resemble inter-state business. This recognition of what is
in fact occurring, is a basis for decisions by states and international or-
ganizations and merits concern and attention.
In particular, the emergence of an autonomous Palestinian entity (al-
kiyan al-filastini) without sovereignty,3 resulting from the multilateral
Ph.D., 1973, The American University, School of International Service, Profes-
sor, Dept. of Political Science, Catawba College.
1. Daniel Jacobs. Researching Gaza An Author's Diary, No. 2 ROUGHNEwS 7
(1997).
2. Sanford Silverburg. The Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations,
12 ISRAELL. RaV. 365, 392 (1977).
3. The selection of the descriptor "entity" is borrowed from the research of MOSHE
SHEMESH THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 1959-1974 (1996). See also Sanir Anabtawi. The
Palestinians as a Political Entity, 60 THE MUSLIM WORLD 47 (1970) and Julius Stone.
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negotiations begun at the Madrid Conference (1991) continuing through
the Hebron Agreement (1995), presents an opportunity to witness a
unique development in international law.4 There is adequate evidence in
Peace and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 247 (1970).
4. For a discussion of the Madrid Peace Conference see 2 DISPATCH 775 (1991),
id., at 806-810; 2 PUB. PAPERS PRES. US: GEORGE BUSH 1308 (1992), id. at 1352, 1362-
1364; Jorge Dezcallar de Mazarredo. Conferencia de Madrid para la Paz en Oriente
Media in La Paz En Oriente Medio: Seminario Celebrado En La Escuela Diplomd±tica
Los Dias 27-48 (20 a 23 de Febrero de 1995). For a general collection of documents
relating to the "peace process," see http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il.peace/palest.html It is
worth noting that all the "agreements" reached between Israel and the Palestinians,
while commendable as an approach to develop regional stability, they fall short of "in-
ternational agreements," which must be "concluded between states." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969). For an argument contra see John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements:
Are They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 717 (1997). Oslo I consists of the following:
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Govermment Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-P.L.O., 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter DOP]; Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-
P.L.O., 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement]; Protocol on Economic
Relations Between Israel and the P.L.O., 33 I.L.M. 696 (1994) (later included as an
appendix to the Cairo Agreement). Together the DOP and Cairo Agreements constitute
Phase 1 of an interim agreement. The Camp David Agreements were to establish a Pal-
estinian "self-governing authority" which would lead to a final solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, including peaceful resolution of outstanding issues and to be sure, terri-
tory. Camp David Agreements, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Isr.-U.S., 17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978).
Following actions were: Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsi-
bilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., 34 I.L.M. 455 (1994) [hereinafter Erez Agreement];
The Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Sept. 28, 1995, UN
Doc. A/51/889 (1995) [hereinafter Further Transfer Protocol]; Arab League: Final
Communiqui of the Cairo Summit Conference on Mideast Peace and Decisions on New
Institutions, 35 I.L.M. 1280 (1996). Oslo II: The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997);
Taba Agreement: Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, Joint Communiqu6
on the Permanent Status Negotiations, Taba, Egypt, May 5-6, 1996, Isr.-P.L.O.,
<httpf/www.israel-mfa.gov.il/peace/taba5961html>; Hebron Agreement: Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization: Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the
City of Hebron (TIPH) and the Memorandum of Understanding Between Denmark,
Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey on the Establishment of TIPH, 36
I.L.M. 547 (1997); Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Protocol Concerning the
Redeployment in Hebron and Note for the Record, 36 I.L.M. 650 (1997). For the text of
a Letter of Assurance to Israel by the American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
Jan. 15, 1997 see N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997 at A31 and 3 ISRAEL AFF. 343-344 (1997);
For the Secretary Christopher's letter and the Israeli Cabinet's "Communique" of Janu-
ary 16, 1997 see 26 PAL. STUD. 139-140 (1997). For a version of Israeli and Palestinian
interpretation of the various agreements see SAMUEL SEGEV. CROSSING THE JORDAN:
RABIN'S ROAD TO PEACE, Chap. 12 (1998).
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place to indicate that a process of institutionalized state-building5 has
been put into place at least since the most recent Palestine Declaration of
Independence. 6 These developments bear witness, if for no other reason
than the ambivalence exhibited by the international political community,
to the issue of an acceptable non-state actor role in the international
community of states. Therefore, the recognized referent, as the observer
must make, is that it is an imperfect system. It is sometimes, perhaps even
frequently, disheartening to jurists to observe change particularly if it is
directed by or from non-western sources. According to one court, "to in-
terpret various human rights documents as imposing legal duties on non-
states like the PLO would require both entering a new and unsettled area
of international law and finding there an exception to international law's
general rule."7 Certainly, following World War I and World War II, other
territories and colonies that came under mandatory jurisdiction evolved
into states.8 The political process as practiced in the post-World War II
era, focusing on the phenomenon of de-colonization and the concomitant
5. MOHAMMED AL-AZAR. DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM IN PALESTINE. (1996); HILLEL FRISCH, COUNTDOWN To STATEHOOD:
PALESTINIAN STATE FORMATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (1998); GLENN
ROBINSON, BUILDING A PALESTINIAN STATE (1997); THE PALESTINE COUNCIL:
STRUCTURE, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1996); Francis Boyle, The Creation of the
State of Palestine, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 301 (1990); see also Boyle, Create the State of
Palestine, 7 ScAND. J. DEv. ALTERNATIVES 25 (1988); Mark Heller, Towards a Pales-
tinian State, 39 Survival 5 (1997); Ann Lesch, Transition to Palestinian Self-
Government, 22 J. PAL. STUD. 46 (1993); Kathryn McKinney, The Legal Effects of the
Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18
SEATrLE U.L. REv. 93 (1994); David Newman and Ghazi Falah, Small State Behavior:
On the Formation of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 39 CAN.
GEOG. 219 (1995). Menachem Mautner has suggested that a Palestinian political organi-
zation with a status of more than autonomy but less than sovereign was the best solution
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. See Menachem Mautner, West Bank and Gaza: The Case for
Associate Statehood, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 297 (1981).
6. PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 43 GAOR,
Annex 3, Agenda Item 37, 13, U.N. Docs. A148/827 and S/20278 (1988) reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 1660 (1988); See generally Maurice Flory, Naissance d'un itat palestinien, 93 G.
G9N INT'L PUB. 389 (1989). The first Declaration of [Palestinian] Independence was
issued on October 1, 1948. The text is reprinted in 4 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 294 (1987/88);
Mr. Khalil Tufakji was commissioned by the Palestine National Authority (PNA) to
produce an "official map" of Palestine showing the "Palestinian State," comprising the
entirety of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Israel, and some of Jordan. See
<http://www.palestine-net.com/geography/gifs/palmap.giv>. It might be interesting to
learn, Mr. Tufakji has been similarly commissioned by the PNA to design and locate a
capitol building, on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem (or as it is known in Arabic, Ras
al-Amud, which also includes the neighborhood of Mitzpe Daniel).
7. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 806 (1984).
8. See Appendix 2, JAMES CRAWFORD. THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 426-428 (1979).
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increased demand for national self-determination, rests on a belief that as
long as states exist and evolve in form, a new criteria for bringing them
into existence may be introduced. But as has been apparent, all new pro-
posals are based upon the existence of already existent sovereign entities
or at least a formally established and separate territorial element recog-
nized as distinctive. The issue of the legitimacy of any act of recognition
of such political units may, of course, come subsequently.
Palestine, while appreciating the dangers of the assertion as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, is a state in statu nascendi 9 (something in the process
of becoming, but which hitherto has not received either the attention or
the formal international legal support generally reserved for traditional
subjects of international law.)' 0 The legal maxim nasciturus pro jam nato
habetur I  applies in this instance and carries a set of recognized strictures.
Brownlie, whose approach is close to political expediency, takes the po-
sition that "If]or certain legal purposes it is convenient to assume conti-
nuity in a political entity and thus to give effect, after statehood has been
attained, to legal acts occurring before independence." 12 Even after state-
hood is assumed, "it is justifiable, both legally and practically, to assume
the retroactive validation of the legal order during a period prior to gen-
eral recognition as a state, when some degree of effective government
existed." From his approach, there is an understanding that political
events occur with a frequency that outpaces any commanding legal
authority. Realizing the need to maintain a relationship of law to politics,
9. See generally, id. at 391-398; IAN BROWNLIE, PRIN. OF PUB. INT'L L. 82 (1973);
Friedrich von der Heydte, Rechtssubject und Rechtperson im Vdlkerrecht, in
GRUNDPROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTS 237 (D. Constantopoulous et al. eds.,
1957); M. VorsterThe International Legal Personality of Nasciturus States, 4 S. AFR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1978); See also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES
346-348 (1995); for an older version of the phenomenon see R. Erich, La Naissance et
la reconnaissance de itats, RECUEIL DES COURSE, 1926, 111, at 431.
10. The interest here is specific, particular and completely within an international
legal context. See generally, MUSA MAZZAWI, PALESTINE AND THE LAW: GUIDELINES
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 291-295 (1997); a more politi-
cal tone can be inferred from other commentaries; see for example, Katherine Meighan,
Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, 34 VA. I. INT'L L. 435, 467 (1994);
contra Justus Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft Law-The Israel-PLO Declaration of Prin-
ciples and the Prospect for Peace, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 931 (1995).
11. Literally, "Those who are about to be born shall be considered already born."
DAVID WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION To LAW 133 (1980); the notion emanates
from Roman law; See for example, G. INST. 1.147; DIG. 1.5.7. (Paulis); DIG. 1.5.26
(Salvus Julianus); DIG. 38.16.7 (Juventius Celsus); DIG. 50.16.231 (Paulianus); an
analogy to the juristic personality of an individual, according to the French Civil Code is
where an infant not yet born is subject to the rights of inheritance when viable, C. CIV.
§§ 725, 906.
12. BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 66.
13. Id. at 82.
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a principle of continuity is given heavy weight or value.
Therefore, left aside is the intriguing but necessarily entangling idea
of a two-state or bilateral option in the region within an historic
Palestine.14 However, as has been asserted by Palestinians as an historical
fact, if Palestine is an integral whole then conceivably any dismember-
ment violates the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples.' 5 The argument put forth here is that there has
never been a state of Palestine, and thus no territorial integrity to suborn.
Actually, the process of Palestinian state development is a continua-
tion after an interregnum of close to 50 years of a combination of inter-
related historical dynamics. The League of Nations was succeeded, po-
litically at least, by the United Nations. In its collective judgement, the
United Nations recommended the partition of mandatory Palestine into an
Arab state and a Jewish state. 16 The Arab state members of the'United
Nations, but not an organized Palestinian body, "responding to the will of
the Palestine Arab majority, rejected the Partition Plan."' 7 In the ensuing
hostilities between the Palestinians, supported and abetted by their allied
and neighboring Arab states and the newly declared State of Israel, the
later never occupied completely mandatory Palestine. Presumably then,
whatever portion of mandatory Palestine was not under control by Israel
became available for reconstitution.' 8 In fact, in September 1948, in an
attempt to maintain a legitimate claim of governance, an Arab Govern-
ment of All-Palestine, now defunct, was formed by the Arab League
14. Some proponents of Palestinian statehood have argued that pursuant to United
Nations resolutions, "there is continuing authority for the establishment of two states in
Palestine." W. THOMAS MALLISON AND SALLY MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 206 (1986); Chairman Arafat proposed a
"two-state solution" initiative in the U.N. General Assembly in Geneva on December
13, 1988; U.N. Doc. A/453/PV.78 (1988).
15. G.A. RES. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
16. G.A. Res. 181 (II), 2 U.N. GAOR, Resolution 131, 132, U.N. Doc. A1519 (1947).
17. Nabil Elarby, Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the
1949 Armistice Agreements, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 103 (1968). It should also
be noted that the Arab Higher Committee, the only recognized "national" Palestinian
political body, rejected the Resolution on November 30, 1947; see ISSA KHALAF,
POLITICS IN PALESTINE 169 (1991).
18. Professor Van de Craen argues that "the juridical status of the remaining Pales-
tinian territory can only be made by the use of the concept of 'sovereign vacuum,"'
permitting the Palestinians to enter a claim at some subsequent point in time. Frank
L.M. van de Craen, The Territorial Title of the State of Israel to "Palestine:" An Ap-
praisal in International Law, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL 500, 505
(1978/79). Because of a consideration the that the Israeli presence in Palestinian areas
not allocated by the United Nations Partition Plan could be labeled as belligerent occu-
pation, territorial sovereignty that could similarly be sought by Palestinian political
authority, not yet established, must be rejected. The disposition of the territory under
review after 1949 was determined by armistice agreements and not any treaty of peace.
1998]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
(without the compliance of Jordan) in Gaza. This political act was done
on behalf of all Palestinians, ostensibly to govern the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. However, little was to come from this development since the
West Bank was annexed by Jordan in 1950 and Eg t "supervised" as a
trustee an independent government in Gaza in 1959.
While the forecasted outcome of a political development is certainly
speculative, 20 it is argued that the nature of diplomatic recognition defines
the status of-the targeted organization by virtue of the nature of inter-state
exchange. The formal action taken by states and international organiza-
tions afforded to the Palestine National Authority (PNA) is such that the
political body, while recognized as less than a sovereign state, is certainly
more than a completely dependent colonial enterprise.
There are two areas of concentration in this current exposition: dip-
lomatic recognition and economic trade relations. In both instances, the
emblematic nature of the nation state in a state-centric system is to be
seen as transitory. The expansion in the number of states combined with
an increased awareness of the global extent of issues that affect humanity,
sometimes with grave consequences, has spurred an intent in creating
conditions that lessen tensions while simultaneously providing human
benefits. Trade and investment have been essential characteristics of in-
dustrial regions and drive pacific state relations. In order for economic
relations to develop and produce positive results, political stability must
serve as a foundation. A world in which liberal economies foster stability
in due course encourages acceptance of reasonably viable political units.
In writing about new international relations theory or new states in a
chain of developments, one commentator has noted "that the contempo-
rary global system of sovereign states has emerged out of an earlier Euro-
centric system of 'civilized' and before that 'Christian' states." The evo-
lutionary process, the author goes on to claim, has retained its constancy
"because the underlying imperatives of independence are still the
same, ', 21 but the context of the process has moved to greater complexity.
19. For a discussion of the perfunctory efforts to maintain an illusion of Palestinian
governing authority during the years immediately after the establishment of Israel, see
HUSSEIN HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES (1975).
20. From polling data we can derive that among Israelis there is a growing belief that





ASHER ARIAN, ISRAEL SECURITY AND THE PEACE PROCESS: PUBLIC OPINION IN 1994 6
(1994).
21. ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
AND THE THIRD WORLD 79 (1993).
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I. PALESTINE As A POLITICAL CONCEPT
The nation-state system or the Westphalian system developed in
Europe as a western and predominantly Christian political organization,
which was subsequently superimposed on the remaining extent of the
globe through imperial and colonial exploits.22 The limitation of a peo-
ple's political expression was set by the sole tangible quality of geo-
graphic borders. The manner of acceptance in the "civilized" world was
also to no small degree conditional upon adherence to European cultural
norms of existence, at least up through the middle of the 20th century.
23
In the Islamic world, the concept of "the state" has existed but with a dis-
tinguishably different heritage and orientation from its Christian counter-
part.24 Hence, for Palestinians, for many generations at least, the sense of
peoplehood was present providing substance but without the form of a
western state present.25 This condition did not occur due to of a lack of
intent to do otherwise. Essentially, the regional culture was not suscepti-
ble to the acculturation process necessary to adjust in the time period as
presented to the non-western people resident there. Additionally, the
western understanding of the modem state as it developed in the contem-
porary period requires an industrial base. With the superimposition of a
modem capitalist system, many scholars of nationalism hold that there is
a tendency that serves as a demolishing instrument of traditional societies
i.e., pre-industrial or agriculturally based societies. Thus any organic na-
ture of Palestinian political organization was rendered subservient to an
industrially oriented competitor, in this case European-based and accul-
turated Zionists. The Arab, Palestinian and other opposition to political
22. From a positivist perspective, the initiation of the state system emerged from
Christian civilization (at least in the period prior to Westphalia). See the canon law in-
terpretation given by Hostiensis. G. Le Bras, Thiologie et droit romain dans Henri de
Suse, in ETUDES HISTORIQUE A LA MP-MOIRE DE NOEL DIDIER 195 (1960). It was not
until 1856 and the organization of the Concert of Europe, that a non-Christian state, in
this case Ottoman Turkey, was admitted into a European qua Christian political system.
See TRAVERs TWiSs, LE DROrrDES GENS 83 (1887).
23. J.A. Andrews, The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the
Nineteenth Century, 94 L.Q. REv. 408 (1978).
24. See generally, CHRISTINE HELMS, ARABISM AND ISLAM: STATELESS NATIONS AND
NATIONLESS STATES (1990) [McNair Papers No. 10]. For an understanding of the de-
velopment of the Islamic political community see generally, MOHAMMAD AL
GHUNAIMI, THE MUSLIM CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WESTERN
APPROACH 61-70 (1968). For an examination of the Islamic state from the perspective of
a non-Muslim historian, see R. Serjeant, The Constitution of Medina, 8 ISLAMIC Q. 3
(1964); See also, The 'Sunnah Jam'ah' Pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the 'Tahrim' of
Yathrib, 41 BuLL. SCH. ORIENTAL& AFR. STuD. 1 (1978).
25. To examine the formation of the Palestinian national self see Sari Nusseibeh,
Personal and National Identity: A Tale of Two Wills in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 205-220 (Tomie Kapitan ed., 1997).
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Zionism, from its inception took on the character of a mantra for fear and
threat perception of cultural and dispossessive foreign imposition.
26
There are many plausible explanations diachronically for the varied
declarations and understandings of cultural groups' self-awareness. The
effect of modernity on either Arab nationalism or Palestinian nationalism,
assuming arguendo there is a difference, has not reduced the anxiety of
the subject peoples but has placed contemporary generations in a cogni-
tive position whereby their frame of reference is current and thus the
standard of evaluation is different from that which was dominant in the
pre-decolonization period.
In the case of the Palestinians, when their perception is blended with
similarly situated people who may have emerged with a recognized po-
litical structure because of a preexisting territorial setting, their factual
support pales. Contextually some theorists hold that nationalism is not
necessarily "modem." Rather it is subject to a series of historical devel-
opmental forces that allies itself to cultural coherence, which places the
controversy over Palestinian nationalism in still more of a controversial
focus.2
7
In the contemporary period, Palestine 28 was an amorphous geopoliti-
cal territory within the Ottoman Turkish Empire. As one Palestinian
scholar and expert on Palestinian nationalism notes, "there was no politi-
cal unit known as Palestine" in the Ottoman Empire. 29 Even in the pre-
mier examination of the development of Palestinian nationhood, one can
26. For a survey see Sami Zubaidi, Theories of Nationalism in POWER AND THE
STATE 52-71 (Gary Littlejohn et al. eds. 1978); See also Wolfgang Mommsen, The Va-
rieties of the Nation State in Modern History in THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NATION
STATE 210-226 (1990).
27. See e.g., Anthony Smith, The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myths of Na-
tions, 11 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1 (1988). As the theme is connoted within an Islamic
context, see SAMI ZUABAIDA, ISLAM, THE PEOPLE AND THE STATE chap 6 (1989). For a
characterization of the Palestinian economy from 1917 to 1945, see Bernard Wasser-
stein, The British Mandate in Palestine in MIDDLE EASTERN LECTURES NUMBER ONE
29, 37 (1995).
28. For a general treatment of the nature of the territory in historic. texts see SUSAN
ROLEF, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF PALESTINE: A HISTORY AND DEFINITION
(1983)[Middle East Review Special Studies, no. 3]; Louis Feldman, Some Observations
on the Name of Palestine, 61 HEBREW UNION COLL. ANN. 1 (1990); Bernard Lewis,
Palestine: On the History and Geography of a Name, I1 THE INT'L HIST. REv. 1 (1980).
For the history of ancient Palestine see generally, GOSTA AHLSTRPOM, THE HisT. OF
ANCIENT PALESTINE (1993); DAVID FIENSY, THE SOCIAL HIST. OF PALESTINE IN THE
HERODIAN PERIOD (1991); MOSHE GIL, A HIST. OF PALESTINE, 634-1099 (1992); A.
AL-KAYYALI, PALESTINE (1978); ISMAIL SHAMMOUT, PALESTINE (1972); ROBERT
WILKEN, THE LAND CALLED HOLY (1992). For the relationship between ancient Israel
and ancient Palestine, see Marit Skjeggestad, Ethnic Groups in Early Iron Age Pales-
tine, 6 SCAN. J. OLD TEST. 159 (1992).
29. MUHAMMAD MUSLIH, THE ORIGINS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 12 (1988).
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find no formal setting beyond a "sense" of place, "a sort of sacred, if not
yet a national, space." 30 Following World War I and as a result of that
conflagration, the Ottoman Turkish Empire was despoiled by the victori-
ous European alliance, and the Arab territories were divided into zones of
occupation. The British military presence in Jerusalem and its environs
early in December 1917 placed its government in a preeminent position
to claim belligerent occupant rights. The British succeeded. Although the
initial military administration established was meant to be transitional,
3
the following year an Occupied Enemy Territory Administration-South
(O.E.T.A.-South) was created. The principle of postliminium, with regard
to the dismantling of Turkish Near and Middle East territories in accor-
dance with a peace treaty, had to be held in abeyance until the French
were assuaged, which was done at the Inter-Allied Conference at San
Remo in April 1920.32 Again, following the European tradition and expe-
rience, the nation-state organizational form was extended by the western
creation, the League of Nations, and operating as a formal political-legal
agent of the major western powers, demarcated Palestine and made Great
Britain the mandatory power.33 It should be noted with great importance
that it is only at this point in time and because of the action taken by the
League of Nations in conjunction with Great Britain that the factor of
30. RASHID KHALIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY 29 (1997). Except for Khalidi's work,
there is no equivalent substitute in English for the treatment of the development of a
Palestinian consciousness in a political realm.
3 1. BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, THE BRITISH IN PALESTINE 18 (1978).
32. GREAT BRITIAN. PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 1920, Misc. No. 11, Cmnd. 675. As a
result, the territory east of the Jordan River was separated from Syria (Bilad al-Sham)
and meant to be incorporated in the Palestine Mandate under British supervision. Many
Palestinians demonstrated a nationalistic response in terms of Palestine being a part of
southern Syria (Suriyya al-Janubbiyya). See Yehoshua Porath, The Political Organiza-
tion of the Palestinian Arabs Under the British Mandate in PALESTINIAN ARAB PoLTmcs
8-9 (Moshe Maoz ed., 1975).
33. Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the
League of Nations, July 24, 1922, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OJ. 1007 (1922) (entered into
force Sept. 29, 1923). Both the British military and provisional governing authority
(during the period of occupation and until the acquiring of mandatory authority) in-
cluded what is present day, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. With the Mandate for
Palestine, a separate state of Trans-Jordan was unilaterally created by the British. Art. 2
id. refers to the area east to the Jordan river as "Trans-Jordan," and understood to be
administered under the control of the Amir Abdullah. The final conclusion of belliger-
ency was only completed by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 117 BFSP 543, which fol-
lowed the negotiations over the Treaty of Srvres (1920), 113 BFSP 652, an agreement
that was unratified. One commentator discussing the role of the United Nations as a
forum to bless the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, refers to Palestine "as one
of the territories detached from the Turkish Empire." Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Collec-
tive Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia
and Palestine, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 135, 197 1990 (emphasis added).
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territoriality was attached to what Palestinians understood then and now
to exist in situ, but in point of fact only existed in another cultural and
hence legal context. Palestine was never considered terra nullius because
there was no such legal body before its creation by externally regional
diplomatic negotiations. The beginnings of what could evolve into a state,
as understood in western political and legal parlance, originated as a
mandate and was never an "old state" or an "original state" interrupted by
historical forces to become a "new state." 34 The act of creating a mandate
in the generally recognized region of ancient Palestine, in effect, lent a
modicum of juridical personality to the territory, thereby legitimizing the
governing authority and in turn setting into motion an historic process
whereby the components of statehood could become established. Interna-
tional legal authorities, for reasons of their own but who support the Pal-
estinian cause and demand for political self-determination, support the
notion that there was a Palestine in the past, that is prior to 1917. To
complicate the history of "modem Palestine," and to indicate its pure
anomalous nature requires an examination of how and why Trans-Jordan
was diplomatically excised from mandatory Palestine in 1922 and anoited
with statehood. 5
However, as stated above, a Palestine within the western political
understanding of the term, simply never existed.36 Indeed, the failure to
establish a western-based territorial element in a rhetorical frame of ref-
erence had done much for years to cloud discussion over relevant issues
but more importantly made the arguments for such a condition a non se-
quitur.3 7 On a more positive note, from this temporal point forward the
34. The distinction between "old" and "new" states was made by the delegate from
Ceylon at a meeting of the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General Assembly. This
meeting, held in October 1968, dealt with the Report of the Int'l Comm'n on Succession
of States and Governments in Respect of Treaties. See U.N. Doc. A/C 6/SR 1036
(1968).
35. Yitzhak Gil-Har, The Separation of Trans-Jordan from Palestine in THE
JERUSALEM CATHEDRA 284-313 (Lee Levine ed., 1981).
36. One can read the works of notable specialists such as Professor John Quigley who
claims: "From the sixteenth century until World War I, Palestine was ruled by the Otto-
man Empire." See John Quigley, Judicial Autonomy in Palestine: Problems and Pros-
pects, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 698, 700 (1996). Sometimes, Professor Quigley's charac-
terizations are hyperbolic, to wit: "For as long as history records, the Palestinians have
been the majority population in Palestine." See Quigley, The Oslo Accords: More Than
Israel Deserves, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 285 (1997). For a fuller treatment of
relevant issues by Professor Quigley, see PALESTINE AND ISRAEL (1990).
37. Perhaps one example will suffice:
On April 20, 1920, the Supreme Allied Council allocated the Palestin-
ian Mandate to Great Britain. In March of 1921, the British detached all
territory east of the Jordan River from Palestine and established the
emirate of Transjordan. This territory had historically been a part of
Palestine since before the arrival of the Hebrews led by Moses.
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conflict of interests between Palestinians and Jewish Zionists operates
with a great deal more symmetry, even if there are significant differences
in strategies and approaches to their respective political goals and ideolo-
gies.
The argument put forth here then is that a people in the Arab world
with a self-identity as Palestinian were a settled folk during the period of
Ottoman Turkish control in some demarcated portion thereof. As outlined
above, a Palestine was ultimately created, albeit not by Palestinians, and
almost immediately subject to violent contention. Years of sporadic low-
intensity conflict between Israel and Palestinians were followed by the
creation of the PLO in 1964. By 1968 the PLO was clearly an organiza-
tion that was committed to debate the State of Israel. In twenty years, this
strategy moved to a two-state solution, while the current peace process
holds out the possibility of Palestinian autonomy. Characterizing this
ideological development is an anecdote from a meeting of the PLO's
Central Committee in Tunis, held on October 10, 1993, where Mahmoud
Abbas (aka "Abu Mazen"), a Palestinian diplomat who helped frame the
Oslo Accords, told Chairman Arafat that "it was now 'time to take off the
uniforms of the revolution and put on the business suits of the nascent
Palestinian state.'
38
The nature and status of political autonomy in the annals of interna-
tional law is unique. On this point Benvenisti points out two forms: inter-
nal and international. Internal autonomy exists as a political unit within a
sovereign state while international autonomy involves multinational ad-
ministration. The autonomy established by the Cairo Agreement is for a
territory, the extent of which is yet to be negotiated.39 Even if the territo-
rial element of a state is present there are other factors to consider, which
for our purpose here take primacy in the evaluation of the argument pre-
sented. While the Palestinians have no sovereign title to territory, there is
an established governing authority that maintains an ability to insure
relative internal order and an ability to insure relative internal order and
as pointed out, conducts regular diplomatic relations with states and in-
ternational organizations. These conditions cannot be claimed by all other
established states.40
M. Cherif Bassiouni and Eugene Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Confict-Real and Apparant Is-
sues, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 438 (1970).
38. SEGEV supra note 4, at 285.
39. Eyal Benvenisti, The Status of the Palestinian Authority in THE ARAB-ISRAELI
ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTVES 60 (Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat eds., 1996).
40. The point here is to highlight the near-anarchic state conditions found presently in
Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia in each of which nations are
seen to implode. One United States court has held at least that "any government, how-
ever violent and wrongful in its origin, must be considered a de facto government if it
was in full and actual exercise of sovereignty over territory and people large enough for
a nation." Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 594, 620 (1878) (Clifford, J. concurring)
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I. SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The issue is limited to those elements that most directly affect the
present theme. Therefore, a state, for purposes of a positivistic approach
to public international law, is the primary subject for purposes of locus
standi. Accordingly, the demanded status requires four well known and
recognized elements: 1) "a permanent population," 2) "a defined terri-
tory," 3) a "government," and 4) the "capacity to enter into relations with-
the other states" of the international political system.41 In the opinion of
one jurist, territoriality is the primary characteristic of the state and an
absolutely necessary characteristic for its existence.42 Although it could
be argued, as has been in some quarters, that a "political community"
may be more important.43 The notion of a geographically fixed presence
for the governing authority lends itself to predictable outcomes. However,
the state is an artificial creation for some functional purposes in place and
time. As the required function of organization realigns with conditions of
a changing world, so has the legal system adapted commensurately. 4 The
(emphasis added). Having said this, it should also be stated that non-state actors are not
widely recognized for purposes of a cause of action in U.S. courts. See Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747
F.Supp. 1452, 1462, 1469 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Carmichael v. United Technologies
Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988).
41. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. I, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. See also, THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, at §201 (1987), which requires inter alia that an entity "engages in,
or has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other such entities." See also Na-
tional Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied 489 U.S. 1081 (1989); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1868).
42. United States v. Netherlands, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 839 (1928)
(Huber, Arb.) (Huber, M., separate opinion). Taking various historical and cultural fac-
tors into consideration, the issue of territorial sovereignty can be found in the decisions
of the Legal Standard of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53 Apr. 5). See also, Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116; (Dec. 18); The
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U. K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). Professor Quigley,
a reknown advocate of Palestinian self-determination and an acute observer of the
changing character of statehood in the world today, states, 'Even without control of
territory in the usual sense, however, the PLO exercised considerable powers in the
Gaza Strip and West Bank through its control of various organizations carrying out
quasi-governmental functions." Quigley, supra note 4, at 724 (emphasis added).
43. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den. And F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1960
Judgement), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 20).
44. The classic approach to this theme is, of course, John Herz, Rise and Demise of
the Territorial State, 9 WORLD POL. 473 (1957); John Herz, The Territorial State Revis-
ited, I POLITY 11 (1968). From a purely economic perspective see JEAN-MARIE
GLHANNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE (1995); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE
NATION STATE (1995). For a discussion on the impact of global economic issues see
Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State, 50 WORLD POL. 62 (1997). See generally, DAVID
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expansion of general categories of subjects of international law was to
occur in 1949 when the International Court of Justice recognized the
United Nations as an international person for purposes of juridical
status.45 Briggs suggests that "absence of one or more of these criteria
over relatively long periods has not been regarded by other States as de-
priving such States of legal capacity under international law." 46 However,
he conflates two completely different categories of states in support of his
argument. For example, Albania, which could be said a configured terri-
tory prior to admittance to the League of Nations, and Israel, which
emerged from a completely different political arrangement serve to re-
duce the acceptability of Briggs' assertion. Therefore, his position does
not serve us well in establishing any formal rule to follow.
Controversial but nevertheless applicable to the argument presented
here generally and specifically, is the realistic acceptance of insurgent
groups and national liberation movements under the umbrella of the laws
of war and humanitarian intervention.47 Since the early 1970s, many such
organizations received favorable, and even preferential, treatment by the
United Nations General Assembly. By this time, the General Assembly
had greatly expanded to include many former Metropole colonies. 48 The
affinity of the greater number of like situated states with similarly histori-
J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY (1995); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE
GLOBAL ORDER (1995); HENRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS
(1995); WALTER WRiSTON, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY (1992); Thomas Fors-
berg, Beyond Sovereignty, Within Territoriality, 31 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 355
(1996); Barry Hindess, Power and Rationality, 17 ALTERNATIVES 149 (1992); David
Kanin, The Stare, Its Dysfunction, and Ours, 34 INT'L POL. 355 (1997); Assa Lindbeck,
The Changing Role of the Nation State, 28 KYKLOS 23 (1975); Oscar Schachter, Is the
State Withering Away? 24 CAN. COUNCIL INT'L L. PROC. 184 (1995); Christoph
Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993); Mihfily
Simai, The Changing State System and the Future of Global Governance, 11 GLOBAL
SEC. 141 (1997); Symposium on the Decline of the Nation State and Its Effects on Con-
stitutional and International Economic Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996); Bruce
Trigger, The Archaeology of Government, 6 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 95 (1974).
45. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174,179 (Apr. 11).
46. THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 66 (Herbert Briggs ed.,
1952).
47. See generally, AZIZ HASBI, LES MOUVEMENTS DE LIBERATION NATIONALE ET LE
DROrr INTERNATIONAL (1981); ABDELWAHAB HECHICHE, L'AUTODETERMINATION
PALESINiENNE ENTRE LE DRorr Er LA FORCE (1991); CHRISTOPHER QUAYLE,
LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INT'L L. (1990); Malcolm Shaw, The International Status of
National Liberation Movements, 5 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 19 (1983); Yezid Sayigh, Armed
Struggle and State Formation, 36 J. PAL. STUD. 17 (1997).
48. For a discussion of the growing United Nations, see Tullio Treves, The Expansion
of the World Community and Membership of the United Nations, 4 FINN. Y.B. INT'L L.
248 (1995).
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cal backgrounds coalesced particularly on political issues such as self-
determination. Current international opinio juris does not provide suffi-
cient clarification regarding any movement away from traditional ap-
proaches of how any people is expected to gain an organic structure of
authority. For example, in a recent German case, the court rendered a de-
cision reserving an opinion held by the European Court of Human
Rights 49 obliging Austria not to deport a defendant to Somalia where it
was suspected he would be subject to violation of Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights because of the lack of state control
over non-state agents.
so
Clearly beginning in 1974, the United Nations saw the eventual
creation of a Palestinian state as a necessary condition to fulfill the
growing acceptance of the norm of national self-determination. 51 Since
the General Assembly operates with plenary voting, the body gave nu-
merous "liberation movements" from developing areas "observer status"
to its sub-groups. In the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), that status was even elevated to the General Assembly itself.5 2
The alacrity of the decolonization process along with the actual numbers
of newly emergent states and concomitant concern for humanitarian is-
sues, and given the voting weight from raw membership, all together in-
creased the overall concern for the respective populations. The practical
realities of international politics and relations may demand from time to
time that strict adherence to acceptance of the state as the sole beneficiary
of international juridical personality be set aside in favor of de factoism.
49. Ahmed v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. B) at 278 (1996).
50. Case 9 C 38.96 BVerfGE, reprinted in INFORMATIONSBR1EF AUSLANDERRECHT
1997, No. 9, at 341.
51- See e.g., G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 4, UN Doc. A/9631
(1974). The role of self-determination is emphasized in: The Right of Self-Detennination
of the Palestinian People, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER/F!3 (1979). While this idea is widely
accepted (as evidenced by state practice), there are still those with strong reservations.
See Sanford Silverburg, In Perepetuation of Myth: National Self-Determination de lege
ferenda, 2 GLENDALE L. REv. 273 (1978). Professor Yoram Dinstein has written, "one
should beware of an anachronistic application of legal norms in temporarilly wrong
settings." See Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, 43 U. NEW BRUNS. LJ. 301,
3154 (1994).
52. The PLO was accorded "observer" status by the U.N. by G.A. Res. 3237, see id.
Observer status was elevated in the summer 1998, by G.A. A/RES/52/250 (1988), to an
unprecedented level when the General Assembly voted to permit the PLO to participate
actively in the general debates within the chamber, as well as other procedural accomo-
dations. For a broader description, see Press Release G.A. 9427, U.N. GAOR, 52nd
Sess., 89th mtg. (1998). The Security Council permitted the organization to participate
in its deliberations when the organization was directly involved. U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess.,
2841st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2841 (1989) contrary to the body's rules as set out in




In the words of one preeminent international legal scholar, Oliver Lis-
sitzyn:
We must...be on guard against attaching too much significance to the
characterization of a particular entity such as a 'State.' Indeed, de-
pending on one's preference, certain entities which are not regarded as
independent but which seem to participate in treaty relations can be de-
scribed either as 'dependent States' or as entities which though not
'States', possess a degree of international personality.
53
In international political economics, particularly in the post-World
War II era, the transition from GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) to the WTO (World Trade Organization) has, while not necessar-
ily subverting state sovereignty, offered a transnational alternative and
thus has added weight to the importance of trans-border economic rela-
tions and agreements.5 4 The argument put forth frequently is that transna-
tional organizations permit a freer exchange of capital, greater flexibility
in organizational style, and fewer limitations on individual behavior. The
interesting development in political relationships on a global level is the
manner of dispute resolution, which is in the context of the WTO, han-
dled through an organizational body though its decisions ultimately affect
members' operability on a inter-national dimension.55 The WTO now
provides for trade dispute resolution by an international organization
rather than permitting unilateral state action. The relevance of this discus-
sion is to bring attention to the growing acceptance of economics and
related organizational structures that impact on what has been an exclu-
sively political sphere of activity. The globalization of economics does
not have full consensus, however. It is recognized by some to be a re-
versible trend and a choice made by national political leaders. 56 But also
53. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities in the Law of Treaties, RECUEIL DES
CouRs, 111, 1, 13 (1970).
54
.See generally, Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial
Law, 46 INT'L & COMPL. L.Q. 1 (1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation
of the World Trading System Through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161 (1995). Still another distinctive develop-
ment is the Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI), currently being negotiated
within the OECD (Organization for European Co-operation), a free-standing interna-
tional treaty open to signature to all OECD members, the European Community, and all
non-members able to meet the required obligations. See <http://www.oecd.orgldaf/cmisl
mai/MAIRAP97.HTM>.
55. World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Comimssion Act:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, United States Senate, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1996); AsiF QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1996); Steven Corley and
John Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of Review, and Deference to Na-
tional Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 1993 (1996).
56. See e.g., Eric Helleinen, From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned
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the argument presented here assumes, inter alia, that the growing global-
ization of trade economics and liberal belief that trade leads to stability
and order underlies much of the desire of states to support the institu-
tional framework of the PNA.
Ill. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
Traditionally in international law, acceptable subjects determine the
parameters for choices available to states' governments to accept simi-
larly situated others into their midst which has effectively been de facto
or de jure recognition of either governments or states. As indicated above,
the international political system is a model of structural change and
many argue for international law to follow the changes accordingly. One
major school of modem thought on diplomatic recognition is the de-
claratory doctrine, which emphasizes the political nature of the exercise
and while not derogating legal responsibility. Nevertheless, this presents
a formal obligation.57 That states and international organizations have
chosen to enter into negotiations and formulate political and economic
agreements with the PNA is an indicator of an appreciation of a putative
state ability to engage in inter-state relations and thus conduct itself in a
regularized manner in the international political community. Professor
Brownlie is instructive here when he opines that "[tihe legal consequence
accorded by governments and foreign courts to the acts of governments
recognized de facto provide evidence for the views" of the process of an
entity assuming statehood.58 The PNA as a recognized governing author-
ity is expected to maintain effective control over territory allocated it pur-
suant to diplomatic negotiations. How effective its control is, internally,
has not had a deleterious effect on recognition of its institutional basis.
The general precursor to the PNA and the public body whose heritage
present day recognition is garnered is the PLO. It has been the process
and pattern of recognition of the PLO that lays the ground for similar and
succeeding action for the PNA. While recognition of the PLO, either as a
representative of the Palestinian people per se 60 or as a diplomatic repre-
Upside Down in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 163-175
(Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 1994).
57. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRIN. OF PUB. INT'L L. 94 (1973). See also, JOE VERHOEVEN,
LE RECONNAISSANCE INTERNATIONALE DANS LA PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINE 721
(1975).
58. Id. at 82.
59. An interesting albeit complicating factor here is the contentious status of the City
and District of Jerusalem which, of course, has been under effective control of Israel
since June 1967.




sentative of the Palestinian cause,6 1 the manner of acceptance is probably
less salient than the act itself. Indeed, statehood may not require recogni-
tion from others in the world community. 6 2 Even though unrecognized,
the United States has accepted "state" action by entities that have not en-
joyed the luxury of diplomatic recognition. 63
All of this is to note that given the nature of the PNA's status and the
sensitivity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, state interaction is not frequently
subject to public notice.64 Nevertheless, the subtleties of diplomacy can
be seen operating in the matter of interaction with the PNA. Hence, with-
out full and complete recognition, there cannot truly be embassies or con-
sulates with the appropriate ambassadors and consular officials. Some
states, therefore, maintain legations in Gaza from which business is con-
ducted as a circumlocution for an otherwise official diplomatic premise.
Representatives of those states that maintain a presence in Gaza, it has
been observed, tend to have preferential status with regard to gaining ac-
cess to PNA officialdom.
There is a frequent claim that the political world has already given
recognition to the Palestinians, first to the PLO and then to its successor,
the PNA. There has been little investigation, however, into the nature or
substance of this assertion. Professor de Waart, for example, boldly holds
that "Palestine has been recognized as a state by a great majority of
members of the United Nations. Western states, however, are still con-
spicuous by their absence under the pretext of legal or political argu-
ments. '65 He goes on to proffer that the 1993 DOP and 1994 Israeli-PLO
61. See MARIA LAHTEENMAKL THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL POSITION: UNTIL THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ALGIERS IN
NOVEMBER 1988 (1994). See also, David Gilmour, The Creation and Evolution of the
Palestine Liberation Organization in PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 46, 56-
59 (Peter Willetts ed., 1982); Anis Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's
Claim to Status, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1980). But see, William O'Brien, The
PLO in International Law, 2 BOSTON U. INT'L L.J. 349, 372-395 (1984).
62. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOR. RELS. OF THE UNITED STATES, § 202
cmt. b (1986).
63. United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99, 101-103 (1875); Thoring-
ton v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1, 9-12 (1868); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss
Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 699 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 403 U.S. 965 (1971).
64. See generally, KARIN AGGESTAM, TWO-TRACK DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO THROUGH OPEN AND SECRET CHANNELS (1996) [Davis
Papers on Israel's For. Pol'y, No. 53].
65. PAUL DE WAART, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (1996) [Birzeit University Law Center Encounters]. See the list of states supplied
by the PLO official news organization, WAFA, in February 1989. 18 J. PALESTINE
STUD. 175-176 (1989). For a detractive commentary on the value of implicit recognition
by virtue of a vote total for a U.N. General Assembly Resolution, see Patrick Travers,
The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in Support of the PLO and National Libera-
tion Movements in Africa, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 561 (1976).
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Agreement gave "international lawyers much food for thought with re-
spect to the legal status of Palestine under international law," all the while
recognizing that the PLO "is neither a state nor an international organiza-
tion."66 Additionally, on November 15, 1988, the Palestine National
Council (PNC) declared at its 19th Extraordinary Session in Algiers, the
establishment "of the State of Palestine in the Land of Palestine with its
capital at Jerusalem." 67 The Declaration, while a grandiloquent rhetorical
statement, was made without effective control over a territory. The
PNC's action, in any case, was followed in December in the United Na-
tions General Assembly with formal statements of recognition reportedly
by at least 100 states.
68
The contention advanced here is that the structure of the international
political system is not fixed and is subject to change. The emergence of
transnational political actors and relations is matched by new forms of
political organization which are recognized by existing states to be effec-
tive bargaining units in diplomatic relations. Some would argue that in-
ternational personality and its expansion remains a fixture of statehood
for determination. 69 Moreover, recognition may not necessarily proceed
from states issuing a formal statement but it may be implied by formal
acts of state such as engaging in diplomatic interaction and concluding an
agreement even below the level of a treaty.70 Now, admittedly, to permit
non-states the degree of recognition that has been accorded states would
only permit greater confusion. Proceeding with the focus at this point
thus leads to economic ties which states and international organizations
have sought either to enter into or to maintain with the PNA as a major
indicator of the potential viability of a sovereign Palestinian body but also
66. DEWAART supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis added). Many of the remarks by Paul De
Waart are prefatory to his general form. See generally, Paul De Waart, DYNAMICS OF
SELF-DETERMINATION IN PALESTINE: PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AS A HUMAN RIGHT
(1994).
67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. It was not lost on Chairman Arafat that
the Declaration was issued in Algeria, as was clearly indicated by his address during the
opening ceremony for the 50th anniversary of the 1948 al-Nakhba (the Catastrophe). AL
QUDS (Jerusalem), Feb. 13, 1998, at 1. The Declaration was not acceptable as "official"
by Australia, Canada, Norway, Spain, and the United States, according to letters to the
Director-General of the WHO. WHO Doc. A42/INF Doc./3, May 1989. See Japanese
sentiment expressed in U.N. Doc. A/43IPV. 82, at 8 (1989) and the US position in id., at
47 as well as its address to the 43rd World Health Assembly. WHO Doc. A43/VR/8, at
3-4 (1989).
68. The United Nations took note of the Declaration in G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N.
GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 62, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989); 34 KEESING'S
RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 36321 (1988).
69. F.A. Mann, International Corporations and National Law, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
147, 153 (1969).
70- Manfred Lachs, Recognition and Modern Methods of International Co-operation,
35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL. 252, 253 (1960).
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a willingness of states to recognize such. Great Britain, for example, con-
ducts its diplomacy with regard to recognition of governments without
being tied to some standardized or formal set of guidelines, although its
policy towards states remains subtantially unaltered.7'
A. Political
Pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in May 1994 and the subse-
quent Further Transfer Protocol of September 1995,72 a Palestinian Na-
tional Authority was created as a transitional body by the PLO according
to the first agreement, the defined authority was then extended to portions
of Gaza and the West Bank by the second.73 But the non-state status of
the PNA precludes its ability to extend its legitimacy in ways that are
reserved for states. In addition, as signatory to the Gaza-Jericho Agree-
ment,74 the PNA is constrained from engaging in a number of actions in
foreign relations, the attention to which has been brought to light by Is-
raeli concerns. A litany of charges raised by Israel illustrates the conten-
tiousness of the PNA's ability to enjoy an international political status of
some note. The Agreement makes clear that following the DOP,75 the
PNA, as distinct from the PLO, "will not have powers and responsibilities
in the sphere of foreign relations." 76 With regard to the conduct of foreign
affairs, Article IX(5)(a) indicates that the PNA is that of "an autonomous
and not an independent entity." Having said that, there is an implicit un-
derstanding that following the precedent set out in the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, if the PNA was to operate with even a modicum of effective-
ness, it would have to have "a mechanism...to enable some dealings with
regard to specific matters between the Palestinian side and foreign states
or international organizations." 77 Therefore the PLO, not the Palestinian
National Council, was to conduct negotiations and sign agreements with
states or international organizations. It was noted that by Israeli officials
that the official Palestinian representative in Egypt is designated as a
PNA official, a violation of Article VI(2)(a). The PLO representative in
Moscow signed a protocol on security cooperation with Russia in the
name of the PNA. Also, the PNA joined the International Airport Council
as the PNA, all in violation of Article VI(2)(b). Noted further, Morocco
71. 983 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 277-9 (1980). See also, Colin Warbrick, The New
British Policy on Recognition of Governments, 30 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 568 (1981).
72. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4.
73. For a discussion and listing of ministers, see Information on the Palestinian
Authority (visited Oct. 10, 1997) <http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PDIN/pdpa.html>.
74. Isr.-P.L.O., supra note 4.
75. id.
76. Id.,at Art VI(2)(a).
77. Joel Singer, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Phase Two, JUSTICE, No. 7, at 5, 13
(1995).
78. Isr.-P.L.O., supra note 4 at Art. IX(5)(b).
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has a "liaison" office in Gaza, a violation of Article VI(2)(c). 79
The distinction between the PLO and the PNA is an important one as
set out in the Agreement. The PLO became the public representative of
the Palestinians in the mid-1960s and received the accolades forthcoming
for any movement towards satisfaction for the demand of self-
determination. But with any public body that enjoys juridical credibility,
there is the concomitant obligation to assume responsibility for its collec-
tive behavior. In the case of the PLO, there is the haunting historical cor-
pus of terrorism, acts for which the body might be held accountable after
statehood if it becomes the constitutional government. The PNA, how-
ever, has been designated as the authorized governing body, regardless of
how transparent the transition appears. To supplement Israeli authority,
specifically to ban the PNA and the PLO from conducting foreign rela-
tions,80 Israel legislated a formal exclusion of Palestinian sources in Jeru-
salem to conduct foreign affairs.
B. Economic
The interest here is to provide a cursory examination of a spectrum
of states and international organizations that maintain commercial contact
with the PNA, through the PLO, or otherwise as an indicator of a phe-
nomenon. More concentrated efforts along this dimension have already
been directed 8 1 and hence will not be further examined.
It is instructive to follow such developments in the area of economic
relations and statements that emanate from such meetings as took place
on February 18, 1998 at the head offices of the Palestinian Ministry of
International Cooperation in the al-Ram section of northern Jerusalem. At
this meeting were representatives from the European Union, Israel, Nor-
way, the PNA, the United States, and the World Bank. The group met to
79. Middle East Peace Process: Hearing Before House Comm. on Int'l Rels., 104th
Cong. 288-289 (1996).
80. Israel. Law Implementing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
(Restriction on Activity), 1994, S.H. 85-6 (popularly known as "The Orient House
Law"). Orient House is the main office of Faysal al-Husseini, appointed by PNA
Chairman Yasir Arafat as minister without portfolio to head Jerusalem Affairs. A num-
ber of official PNA functions, to include diplomatic, are conducted at the Orient House.
See generally, Nadav Shragai, Security Course: Palestinian Institutions Activity In-
tended to Undermine Israel's Sovereignty in Jerusalem, HA'ARETZ (Tel Aviv), Feb. 20,
1997, at A4.
81. David Fidler, Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law
During the Peace Process, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 155 (1998); Keith Molkner, Legal and
Structural Hurdles to Achieving Political Stability and Economic Development in the
Palestinian Territories, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1419 (1996). The most thorough listing
of donor assistance can be found in quarterly monitoring reports of the PNA's Ministry
of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) which maintains its own website.
See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, <htttp://www.pna.netl re-
ports/aidreports/150698/150698.htm> (last modified March 31, 1998).
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work out difficulties between Israel and the PNA that were standing in
the way of further economic development in those areas on the West
Bank and Gaza controlled by the PNA. Perhaps more important was the
announcement of a planned signing of two protocols by France and the
PNA worth $20 million. It was pointed out by the Palestinian representa-
tive that the "protocols fall within the framework of French action to bol-
ster the establishment of the Palestinian state...France does not sign such
agreements except with fully independent countries; Palestine is the only
country [sic.] that is not totally independent with whom France has
signed this kind of agreement.,
82
1. Australia
Australia, which recognizes the Palestinians' right to self-
determination and has publicly noted its expectation of the emergence of
a Palestinian states has also provided funds for the development of "the





Canada has been active in establishing free trade agreements with the
United States and Israel 84 and has begun to enter into a trade relationship
with the PNA.85 In February 1997, the Canadian Minister of International
Trade set into motion a commercial and investment effort.
8 6
82. AI-Ayyam (Ramallah) (Internet version), Feb. 19, 1998. (In Arabic as translated
by FBISIWNC).
83. Aid for Occupied Palestinian Territories, AUSTRALIAN AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. MEDIA RELEASES & HOT ToPics, Dec. 5, 1997, at
AA72, reprinted in <http:llwww.ausaid.gov.aulmedialreslease/ab72.html>.
84. For the text of the Canadian-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) see
<http:llwww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ENGLISH/oEO/AFRIcA/cda-isr.htm>; See also <http://
www.dfait-maeci.ge.ca/english/news/newletr/disweek/1997/fev24.htm>.
85. Dept. of Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade, Eggleton Introduces Legislation to Imple-
ment Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement 180 (Oct. 3, 1996) <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ienglish/news/press.-1/96_press96_180E.HTM> [hereinafter CIFTA]. Mr.
Art Eggleton, Canada's Minister for International Trade, has remarked that CIFfTA
would serve as a sort of platform "to extend benefits to goods produced in the West
Bank and Gaza." He went on to declare: "We are examining ways to best achieve this in
co-operation with the Palestinian Authority." Art Eggleton, Notes for an Address by the
Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister for International Trade, on the Occasion of the
Signing of the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement, (July 31, 1996), in Randall Hofley
and Jason Gudovsky, The Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement: Leveling the Playing
Field, 31 J. WORLD TRADE L. 153, 154, n7.
86. Dept. Foreign Aff. & Int'l Trade, Eggleton Leads Business Delegation to Israel
and the West Bank 31 (Feb. 17, 1997) <http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/pressjre-
leases/97_press/97_031E.HTM>. The direction was indicated by an intent to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding or Protocol with the PLO, but on behalf of the PNA, to
achieve free trade as well as closer Canada-Palestinian trade and investment. See
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3. China
The Chinese government has discussed the possibility of extending a
$12 million loan for the construction of a Chinese medical facility on
1 87both the West Bank and in Gaza.
4. European Union (EU)
The EU relationship with the Palestinians,88 it can be said, began in
1971 when it contributed to the operation of the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA). In 1980, the EU
released the Venice Declaration8 9 expressing support for the general prin-
ciple of Palestinian self-determination. The EU has been the single largest
financial contributor to the PNA for development projects with contribu-
tions of just under 1.7 billion ECU (3.4 DM billion) between 1993 and
1997 for the establishment of democratic institutions. 9° The EU clearly
sees a role to play in the economic development of those areas under the
jurisdiction of the PNA.91 The EU, in its attempt to foster regional stabil-
ity, is actively supporting the peace process." There is also a realistic
understanding that in order for the EU to play the constructive role so
eagerly sought, it would have to take Israeli concerns into consideration.
In this case,.an anti-terrorist stance would occur. To this end, the EU
<http:llwww/dfait-maeci.gc.calenglish/geo/africa/delegation-e.htm>. For more extensive
treatment see CIDA <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index.htm>.
87. Al-Ayyam (Ramallah) (Feb. 24, 1998) <http://www.ayyan.com/index.html>.
88. European Union, The European Union and the Palestinians (1995) IP/96/406
<http://www.ce.pt/textos/IP6406/html>.
89. A Very Successful European Summit Meeting, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEWS, No.
21, June 16, 1980.
90. Andreas Middel, Europea dringt auf mehr Einfluss im Nahen Osten, in DIE WELT
(Internet Version), (Jan. 20, 1998). See <http:/www.welt.de/archiv/1998/01/20/0120
au02.htm>. To its credit, the EU has supplied 50 percent of the development aid to the
Palestinian territories and has been the recipient of 50 percent of Israel's exports. For a
general discussion of a development aid program to the Palestinians see
<http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP)PDIN/pdoverview.html> see also <http://europa.eu.
intlencomm/dglb/en/cisjordan.htm>.
91. Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion by the European
Community of a Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-
operation Between the European Community and the PLO for the Benefit of the Pales-
tinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, COM(97) 51 final.
92. See generally, Communication From the Commission to Council and Parliament
on Future European Union Economic Assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
<http://europa.eu.intlen/comm/dgl6/en/cisjordan.htm>;Communication from the Com-
mission. The Role of the European Union in the Peace Process and its Future Assistance
to the Middle East, COM97/0715/FIN (also known as the [Manual] "Matin Memoran-
dum.") This report was followed by a formal visit to the region by EU Comm'n Presi-
dent Jacques Santer during the first week in February 1998. LE SOIR (Brussels), Feb.
19, 1998, at 7.
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maintains a "special advisor" to the PNA.93 Somewhat related is the EU's
financial support for the Ex-Detainees Rehabilitation Program, an effort




In January 1996, Finland announced it would provide the PNA, over
some undetermined period of time, economic assistance totaling 10 mil-
lion Finnish Marks ($10 million US).95
6. Germany
Germany was the first state following the signing of the DOP to open
a Representative Office in Jericho with the PNA. Its interest in the peace
process was also a motivation in providing substantial financial assistance
to various sectors of the Palestinian economy. 96
7. Great Britain
British assistance represents self-proclaimed contributions to multi-
lateral programs, underwriting the EU's efforts and subsidizing
UNRWA's assistance to Palestinian refugees. Beginning in 1994, British
bilateral aid was proffered and increased during the following year.97
8. Japan
In October 1997 Japan agreed with the PNA to provide the latter
with $17.5 million for education in the Gaza Strip. The importance of the
grant is that it added to the total of $312 million since 1994 and at a time
when the Japanese foreign aid budget planned cuts up to ten percent.
98
9. Jordan
Jordan has gone so far as to establish formal trade relations with the
93. LA LIBRE BELGIQUE (Brussels), Feb. 11, 1998, at 6.
94. Alessandra Antonelli, From Jail to a New Life, PALESTINE REPT., Mar. 13, 1998.
See also, <http://www.birzeit.eduljmcc/weekly/980313pr.html>. Financial support for
this effort is also provided by Italy and Switzerland.
95. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Press Releases: Finland Supports the
Middle East Peace Process and Doubles Economic Aid for the Palestinians, Jan. 9,
1996. See also <http://www.mofile.fi/fennia/um/803/htm>.
96. Communication from Allam Jayyusi, Project Manager of the Aid Coordination
Department, Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation supported
by the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), on the West Bank and Gaza
(Mar. 10, 1998) <allam@nmopic.pna.net>.
97. Foreign & Commonwealth Office London (visited Jan. 1, 1996) <http://www.
fco.gov.uk/current/1996jan/09/hanley-statement aid-to-palestinians.txt
98. AL QUDS (Jerusalem), Oct. 27, 1997 at 1, 19.
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PNA in an attempt to keep its historic commitment to the Palestinians.99
10. The Netherlands
The Netherlands' interest in Palestinian politics and economic devel-
opment is in support of the peace process. There is a strong financial
contribution for the construction of an airfield and a seaport in the Gaza
Strip, amounting to about 40 million guilders in 1997. 1°
11. South Africa
The relationship of the South African Government today to the PNA
is to some degree a result of the regime's pedigree. Since the ruling ad-
ministration is an outgrowth of the efforts of the African National Con-
gress (ANC), a fellow national liberation movement to the PLO, 10 there
is an affinity towards the Palestinians and their political efforts which
appear to mirror those of the ANC.
12. Spain
During 1996, Spain provided $119,048 (US) in humanitarian assis-
tance to the PNA Ministry of Health. The money was made available for
local purchase by Palestinians in need of pharmaceuticals.1
0 2
13. Sweden
For an 18 month period during 1995/96, the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) allocated 216,600 MSEK and
120 MSEK for 1997 for such varied activities as children's health, health
rehabilitation, and police training.10 3 SIDA along with the Institute for
Further Education of Journalists in Sweden (FOJO) also supports finan-
cially The Birzeit University Journalist Training Project.0 4
99. Treaty of Cooperation on Trade, 1995, Jordan-Palestine National Authority [Am-
man, 1995]. (Copy on file with the author); Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Revised
Text of the Treaty of Cooperation on Trade Between the Kingdom of Jordan and the
Palestine National Authority [Amman, 1995]. (Copy on file with the author); Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee. Report [Amman, 1995].
(Copy on file with the author).
100. NRGHANDELSBLAD (Rotterdam), Feb. 6, 1998, at 4.
101. Mandela Calls for International Support to Restructure the ANC, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 28, 1990, at I; See also, Asher Walfish, ANC Visitors Stress Ties with the
PLO, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 1993, at 12. See also, AYRE ODED, AFRICA, THE PLO
AND ISRAEL (1990)[Leonard Davis Inst. for Int'l Rels., Pol'y Stud. No. 37].







The United States has appreciated throughout the peace process the
importance of the West Bank to any Palestinian aspiration for political
self-control. During the administration of George Bush, a presidential
determination was made to allocate funds for economic development of
the area, presumably to aid the bulk of the residents in the area which
were Palestinian.10 5 In an attempt to insure compliance with the Oslo
agreement, particularly the demand that the PNA crack down on terrorist
activity, amend its National Covenant, and negotiate in good faith, the
Congress passed legislation providing the Palestinians with $100 million
of annual aid. 106 In September 1994, the United States signed a treaty
with the PLO for the encouragement of investments which it was be-
lieved would strengthen the Palestinian economy permitting greater
autonomy to commit to a peaceful resolution of conflict. 07 Since the
United States was signatory to a free trade agreement with Israel, goods
imported from Palestinian autonomous areas were at a commercial price
disadvantage with Israeli-produced goods. To offset this advantage, pre-
sumably as an overall diplomatic package, the United States, in April
1995, applied its General System of Preferences (GSP) to cover Palestin-
ian goods.'08 To supplement this action and firm up relations with the
Palestinians, President Clinton signed H.R. 3074109 into law on October
2, 1996 but it was not promulgated until November."l
0
15. World Bank
On October 18-19, 1995, in Paris, representatives of the PNA, Israel,
and the World Bank, along with 29 donor states and international organi-
zations, convened for the expressed purpose of developing an assistance
105. Pres. Determination No. 89-22, 54 Fed Reg. 34,475 (1989).
106. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEDPFA0 OF 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-125,
107 Stat. 1309 (terms extended by Pub. L. No. 103-166, 107 Stat. 1978.
107. See T.I.F. 212 (1997); Hein's No. KAV 4032. See also, Executive Briefing, 18
MIDDLE EAST ExEc. RETS. 4 (1995); S. Miles, Gaza: Foreign Investment: OPIC Loan
Opens Up Investment Opportunities and, 2 MiDDLE EAST COM. L. REV. Al 9 (1996).
108. Public Papers of President William J. Clinton, 1995 at 395 (1996); Proclamation
No. 6778, 60 Fed. Reg. 15, 455 (1995). See also, H. REP. NO. 104-495 (1996) reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485 and S. REP. 104-270 (1996); Economic Development and
U.S. Assistance in GazalJericho: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Near East and South
Asian Aff. of the Sen. Comm. on For. Rels., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The EU has a
preferential trade agreement with the PNA covering the West Bank and Gaza. Israel and
the PNA signed an Economic Protocol in April 1994 in Paris covering trade arrange-
ments between the two.
109. Pub. L. No. 104-234, 110 Stat. 3058 amending the United States-Israel Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act of 1985 to provide the President with additional proc-
lamation authority with respect to articles of the West Bank or Gaza Strip or a qualify-
ing industrial zone, 19 U.S.C. 2112, n.1.
110. Proclamation No. 6955, 61 Fed Reg. 58,761-58,765 (1996).
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program for the Palestinian territories.111 The meeting was a follow-up to
the Taba Agreement, reached a few weeks previously following progress
in the peace process."
12
The World Bank's Consultative Group decided at a meeting in mid-
December 1997 in Paris to pledge $900 million in frants and loan guar-
antees for the first of a three-year development plan.
1 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolutionary nature of international politics has included the
emergence of Palestine as a non-state actor due to its importance in a
major geographical region has given credence to the de facto acceptance
of a structural change in the international political system that is in the
process of being defined. In sequence, the political development of Pal-
estine, while not complete enough to satisfy the standard requirement for
statehood in international law, has been recognized in more than a cour-
tesy manner by virtue of financial investment, economic venture capital
grants, and subtle diplomatic interaction by donor states and international
organizations. Recognition of states in the expressed opinion of Hans
Kelsen can and often is a political, as distinguished from a legal, act but
in this instance "pre-supposes the legal existence of a state or government
to be recognized"' 1 4 while simultaneous.ly having no legal effect nor does
the act in and of itself create an obligation on the part of either the recog-
nizing state or government or the recipient of its political largess. On a
higher plane, the observed practice of some states acting as if in formal
compliance with international norms adds a new dimension to our under-
standing of the Westphalian system, assuming it still exists. It may be a
more cogent assertion to claim that there has been a fundamental recon-
figuration of the system with respect to a model of rule.
It might be said that the more staid understanding of the rules and
norms of public international law was at one time and, until recently, a
fixture of western-dominated state practice. The contemporary era has
become global not only in presence but also in function First politicall,
and eventually economically as private commercial enterprise operates in
the form of multinational corporations and transnational actors in the in-
111. See generally Torunn Laugen, The World Bank and the UN in the Occupied Ter-
ritories, 29 SECURITY DIALOGUE 63 (1998) and Barbara Balaj, Nouvelles approches
pour le d~veloppement 6conomique et social de la Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza,
62 POLTIQUE ETRANGtRE 335 (1997).
112. THE WORLD BANK GROUP. PRESS RELEASE, International Community Reaffirms
Support For Palestinian Development, (Dec. 15, 1997). <http:/lworldbank.
org/html/extdr/extme. 1215pr.htm>.
113. The Jerus, TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1998, at 10.
114. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35
AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941).
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ternational economic system.
The important issue here with regard to Palestine is that unlike the
mandatory period in which internecine family conflict and a general lack
of social and political cohesion set forth the conditions in which the Pal-
estinians confronted a western, socially-based competitor for territory, the
Zionists, the political cohesion now exhibited is visibly accepted by a
broad extent of the Palestinian community. Having failed to achieve their
political objectives in the past, the Palestinians have now organized a
western political dimension, first as the PLO and now in the form of the
PNA, with support from major western states all who ostensibly seek to
stabilize the Middle East and reap some economic benefit therefrom. In
order to accomplish this, it would be necessary to reduce one source of
contention, the Palestinian demand for political self-determination while
simultaneously providing the necessary satisfaction for their nemesis,
Israel and its primary objective, its national security.
The current peace process has done much to move an unorganized
and unaffiliated people to real political status, to autonomy, and in time
what appears to be a sovereign entity. Both the current status of the PNA
and the process that brought the conditions of its operation into evidence
has lent to this organization some sort of legal personality. If international
personality can be denied by virtue of non-recognition, does the obverse
portend furtherance of an anomaly? I suggest that the Palestinian case is
one in the making for study of the relationship of political dynamics re-
lated to the inertia of international legal development.

